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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 11-2941
_______________
THOMAS L. BRYAN,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-07-cv-02121)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 18, 2012
_______________
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2012 )
_______________
OPINION
_______________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Thomas L. Bryan appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. Background
Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our
decision. In October 2004, Bryan applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and for
Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. Bryan’s claim was based
on numerous physical ailments, including degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine.
The state agency denied his application, whereupon he requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). At the hearing, Bryan, who was represented by
counsel, testified about his medical history and symptoms. The ALJ also took the
testimony of an impartial vocational expert concerning the employment that might be
suitable for Bryan in light of his condition. The ALJ denied Bryan’s application. Bryan
then petitioned the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration, which denied
review and thus made the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (the “Commissioner”). See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106−07 (2000);
20 C.F.R. § 422.210.
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Bryan sought review of the ALJ’s
decision in the District Court. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The Magistrate
Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that recommended affirming the
ALJ’s decision. The Court adopted the R&R and affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Bryan appealed this decision to us. We agreed with the District Court that six of
Bryan’s ailments were not disabling such that he was entitled to benefits or income under
the Social Security Act. We thus sustained the Court’s decision as to these ailments.
However, we reversed and remanded to the Court for it to instruct the ALJ to reconsider
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his determination that Bryan had sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform his previous work despite his degenerative disc disease. Bryan v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 383 F. App’x 140 (3d Cir. 2010). In particular, we questioned two points of
the ALJ’s decision. We were concerned that he did not “properly take account of
Bryan’s testimony regarding his daily activities” and “mention significant medical
evidence that directly contradict[ed] [the] conclusion that Bryan was no longer suffering
from significant pain.” Id. at 148.
On remand, Bryan amended his alleged disability onset date from April 2003 to
June 2007. His application subsequently was approved.
Following our decision, Bryan filed his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under
the EAJA for work performed before the District Court and us. Applying our three-part
test (see below) to determine whether the Government had demonstrated that its position
was substantially justified (and thus that an award of fees was not proper under the
EAJA), the Court held that the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified and
denied the motion. Specifically, it determined that the Commissioner’s position had: (1)
a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged because it was supported by substantial
evidence, as indicated by the Court’s affirmance of the ALJ’s decision and our
affirmance of that decision as to all but one of Bryan’s ailments; (2) a reasonable basis
in law because it was grounded in case law; and (3) a reasonable connection between the
facts alleged and the legal theory relied on, again as evidenced by the Court’s affirmance
of the ALJ’s decision and our affirmance of that decision as to all but one of Bryan’s
ailments.
3

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for fees and costs under the EAJA
for abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 682 (3d Cir. 1998). “An abuse
of discretion arises when the district court’s decision ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law[,] an improper application of law to fact[,] . . .
[or] when no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.’” Id. at 682−83
(quoting Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)).
III. Discussion
Under the EAJA, a prevailing party is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs unless
the Government’s position was substantially justified or if special circumstances would
make the award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). On appeal, Bryan argues that the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified because it was contrary to
established precedent. He further contends that the District Court unduly emphasized the
decisions of the ALJ and the Magistrate Judge. 1

1

The Commissioner argues that Bryan is not a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA
because on remand he amended his alleged disability onset date and thus obtained
benefits for a period other than the period for which he argued on appeal before us. We
remanded Bryan’s appeal under the sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) that provides that “the
court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” A plaintiff who obtains a
remand under this sentence is a prevailing party. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292,
300−02 (1993) (stating that a party who obtains a remand under this sentence of § 405(g)
“certainly” is a prevailing party because she or he has “succeeded on any significant issue
4

Under the EAJA, the government’s position is substantially justified if it is
“justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal marks and
citations omitted). As noted, we have established a three-prong test to determine whether
a position is substantially justified. The Government must demonstrate: “(1) a reasonable
basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory it
propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal
theory advanced.” Morgan, 142 F.3d at 684 (citation omitted). Moreover, a “court must
not assume that the government’s position was not substantially justified because the
government lost on the merits.” Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001)
(internal marks and citations omitted).
Here, as the District Court recognized, there was considerable evidence supporting
the Commissioner’s position, including medical history, doctors’ reports, the testimony
of the vocational expert, and Bryan’s own testimony. In addition, both the Magistrate
Judge and the District Court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 568−69 (stating that a court may rely on the
views of other courts on the merits as one “objective indicia” of whether the
government’s position was substantially justified); Friends of the Boundary Waters
Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The most powerful indicator of
the reasonableness of an ultimately rejected position is a decision on the merits and the
in litigation which achieved some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit” (quoting
Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791−92 (1989));
Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2005). Bryan thus is a prevailing party.
5

rationale which supports that decision. The views of the district court and dissenting
judges are properly considered when conducting this inquiry.”).
Further, though we remanded for the ALJ to reconsider Bryan’s testimony
regarding his degenerative disc disease based on our holding that the ALJ was required to
evaluate all the evidence as to a RFC, Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d
112 (3d Cir. 2000), regulations regarding the evaluation of a claimant’s subjective
complaints allow for credibility determinations in light of other medical evidence. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (c)(1), 416.929(a), (c)(1). See also Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d
113, 129−30 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing how the ALJ is to make disability
determinations). The Commissioner’s legal position was not entirely correct, but it did
not rise to the level of unreasonableness. Indeed, we agreed with the ALJ’s assessment
of Bryan’s six other ailments, indicating that there was a reasonable connection between
the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced. The Commissioner’s position thus was
substantially justified. The District Court acted within its discretion in denying Bryan’s
motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses.
*

*

*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s decision.
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